DsSync With Metasploit from NT Autority/System to Administrator
A DCSync attack uses commands in Microsoft Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol (MS-DRSR) to pretend to be a domain controller (DC) in order to get user credentials from another DC.
These attacks leverage what is a necessary function in Active Directory, which complicates attempts to prevent them. Large-scale networks require many DCs to function, and each of those DCs need to have up-to-date information. That requires a function allowing one DC to update another DC on any changes, like updated credential information.
Attackers subvert that necessary function by pretending to be a DC and using the DSGetNCChanges function to request password hashes. A common attack uses this method to get the KRBTGT hash, which brings them one step closer to getting a Kerberos "golden ticket."
DCSync requires a compromised user account with domain replication privileges. Once that is established, one can find a domain controller, tell it to replicate, and get password hashes from its subsequent response.
Initial
we are going to impersonate the Administrator
Add another backslash before the username \\Administrator
We are going to dump the administrator HASHED Password
We are going to dump the KRBTGT HASHED Password
DCSync requires a compromised user account with domain replication privileges. Once that is established, one can find a domain controller, tell it to replicate, and get password hashes from its subsequent response.
DCSync is an attack that allows an adversary to simulate the behavior of a domain controller (DC) and retrieve password data via domain replication. The classic use for DCSync is as a precursor to a Golden Ticket attack, as it can be used to retrieve the KRBTGT hash.
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